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Introduction
Formal models of natural language often suffer from their excessive 
complexity which, in our opinion, may be due to their underlying ap­
proach to language. Indeed, their formal character -nomen est omen­
implies tha t they are doomed to reflect what is ‘natural’ in language in 
an ad hoc fashion only.
In this paper we introduce -through the bias of logic- an alternative 
model of language which stresses its sign character. It is argued that 
language signs (like the signs of logic) are isomorphic and analogous 
to ‘real’ world signs. More specifically, we assume tha t (1) language 
symbols are signs, (2) signs arise from a dichotomous relation of per­
ceived qualities, and (3) the meaning of signs emerges via mediation. 
We argue tha t on the basis of these assumptions and the properties of 
signs, a linearly complex parsing algorithm can be defined.
The first part of this paper is an attem pt to offer a cognitive expla­
nation of a theory of signs. On the basis of this, we introduce a model 
of logical signs in the second part. In the third part, we show how 
this approach may provide a framework for language modelling. We 
exemplify the potential of such a model, introduce a formal definition 
for its parser and prove its complexity.
1. Sign
In our conception of signs we follow the principles of Peirce’s semiotic1 
(Peirce, 1931), (Tejera, 1988), (Jakobson, 1980). Peirce defines a sign as
1 Familiarity w ith Peirce’s theory is not assumed in the  paper.
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he calls the object of the sign. But tha t is only part of the story. 
Equally im portant is tha t a sign always stands for something else in 
some respect. For instance, it is usually acknowledged that smoke stands 
for fire. But smoke does not always stand for fire in the same respect. 
For a person lost in the wilderness, smoke may stand for fire in the 
sense tha t it indicates tha t people may be living there. But it may 
also indicate some danger. The element of a sign in virtue of which 
a sign stands for its object is what Peirce calls an interprétant. Sign, 
object and interprétant (each of which is a sign, recursively) form an 
irreducible relation which is called the triadic relation of sign.
In this paper the focus will be on signs. In our analysis of signs we 
start from the observation that the ground for any sign is a contrast in 
the ‘real’ world. Because sign and object are the primary representation 
of such contrast, sign and object must be different from each other.
In what follows we will use the sample phenomenon John likes Mary 
as our working example. We will assume that John and Mary are present 
for some time, tha t John is smiling, and tha t suddenly it is observed 
that likes occurs between them, and tha t Mary has flowers in her hand. 
W hat signs do we ‘see’ ?
1.1. C o g n i t i v e  g r o u n d s
Before answering the question above, we must first address a more basic 
one: how can we know about signs?
According to cognition theory (Harnad, 1987), the recognition of 
a sign begins with the sensation of a physical input. Physical stimuli 
enter the human receiver via the senses which continuously transform 
the raw data into internal sensation. In its turn, the output of the 
senses, a bio-electric signal, is processed by the brain in percepts. The 
generation of such a percept is typically triggered by a change in the 
input, or by the duration of some sampling time, e.g. in the case of 
visual perception.
The brain compares the current percept with the previous one, and 
this enables it to distinguish between two sorts of input qualities: one, 
which was there and remained there, something stable, which we will 
call a continuant; and another, which, though it was not there, is there 
now (or the other way round), something changing, which we will call 
an occurrent. We will assume tha t a percept may always contain qual­
ities from the memory. Clearly, there will be only such qualities in the 
previous percept in the case of the observation of a new phenomenon.
Following the above model of cognition, we will assume that hu­
man sign processing is based on coherent sensations of collections of
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Figure 1. Cognitive model of sign recognition
continuants and occurrents which, by virtue of their coherency, are 
inherently related to each other. These collections form the basis for 
the perception of a phenomenon as a sign. We also assume that, by 
means of selective attention, we are able to recognise in these collections 
coherent groups of qualities: the qualities of the observed and those of 
the complementary part of the phenomenon (cf. fig. 1). In this paper, 
we will collectively refer to these collections as the input.
In our example we will assume tha t the complementary part con­
tains sub-collections, the continuant ‘John is smiling’(sm), and the 
occurrent ‘Mary has flowers in her hand’(iî), but also memory knowl­
edge about John(J), Mary(M) and likes(i) may be part of the comple­
mentary collections. Using set representation, the continuants(C') and 
occurrents(O) can be defined as follows: C= JM U sm , 0 =  1 Uf? where 
JM = JU M . Notice that J, 1, M, sm and f? are only denotations of 
different collections of input qualities. We will show that on the basis 
of these collections of qualities the proposition John likes Mary can be 
derived. Such a proposition is a complex sign which, as we will assume, 
emerges from more simple signs. The sorts of such signs are introduced 
in the next section.
1.2. T h e  v a r i e t y  o f  s i g n s
In Peirce’s view, the most complete signs are the icon, index, and sym­
bol which represent their object on the basis of, respectively, similarity, 
causality and arbitrary consensus. Besides this taxonomy, Peirce also 
distinguishes signs, respectively, according to the categorical status of 
the sign, and according to the relationship between object and interpré­
tant. Prom a categorical perspective signs can be qualisigns, sinsigns or 
legisigns, which correspond, respectively, to firstness, secondness and 
thirdness. In other words, a sign can be a quality, an actual event, or a 
rule. Seen from the perspective of the relationship between object and 
interprétant, a sign may be a rheme, a dicent or an argument. In other 
words a sign may signify a qualitative possibility, an actual existence, 
or a proposition. Thus we obtain nine kinds of sign and aspect which 
may be arranged in a matrix as shown in fig. 2 (the meaning of the 
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Figure 2. Peirce’s classification of signs
Although Peirce defined more complex systems of signs, we hold that 
his ‘simple’ classification is the most practical. Here, the expressions 
‘class of a sign’ or ‘type of a sign’ will be used interchangeably. In our 
specification of logical and language signs we will make use of Peirce’s 
classes. A comparison between our use of them and his definitions may 
be found in (Farkas and Sarbo, 2000).
1.3. P r i m a r y  s i g n s
We recognise the input qualities as a proposition which is a sign. If, 
as we argue, such a proposition arises from more simple signs, then 
there must exist primary signs. In this paper it will be assumed that 
such signs are the input collections themselves. Indeed, these collections 
satisfy the specification of a qualisign which, according to Peirce, is a 
special sign that we only experience, but for which we have no denota­
tion. Although our qualisigns are coherent, by definition, we experience 
them as independent signs.
Because such a proposition is a relation merging the qualities of 
the observed collections into a single sign, we will assume tha t those 
more simple signs are relations as well. Clearly, any such relation must 
specify the following: which input collections are involved, and which 
operations are applied. Therefore, such relations can always be inter­
preted as formal signs, that is, as signs which are about the form. In 
order to be able to refer to the qualisigns, we will make use of logical 
symbols which are the most general of tha t type of sign (Debrock et al., 
1999), (Farkas and Sarbo, 1999). The most simple sort of them are the 
Boolean logical signs which we will ambiguously call logical signs.
We will represent Boolean logical signs as functions on two variables 
A  and B, respectively, for the continuants and the occurrents, over the 
values 0 and 1, for the complementary and the observed part. We denote 
the observed qualisigns by the functions A  and B  (short for A A B . A  and 
ÀA B .B ), respectively, for the continuant and occurrent collections, and, 
similarly, the qualisigns of the complementary part by the functions ~^A 
and ~ B  (cf. fig. 1). By representing the input collections as sets (in the 
mathematical sense), we can define our ‘universe’ as U = A l)B U ^A U ^B
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that these sets are coherently related to each other, contrary to formal 
logic in which the universe is an arbitrary set. We will assume that 
those sets are finite, therefore U is a ‘closed world’ by definition.
In our example, A = JM  and -■A=sm  (we will finally recognise the 
phenomenon as the proposition John likes Mary which does not refer to 
the continuant sm), B=1 and ~B = fl (which is an occurrent, but which 
we are not focusing on).
1.4. T h e  p r o c e s s  o f  s e m i o s i s
How do complex signs emerge?
We try to answer this question by introducing a model of signs which 
we elaborate for logical signs. In this model it will be assumed tha t the 
semiosis of the input is a process in which triadic relations are generated 
recursively, revealing gradually more accurate and clear approximations 
of the full richness of a sign of the observed phenomenon. Accordingly, 
we will argue tha t the proposition of the input as a sign arises from the 
input qualisigns via a number of other signs. We will assume tha t in the 
semiosis the most complete signs (icon, index and symbol) function as a 
sign in the sense of the triadic relation, whereas the other signs function 
as an object. Notice that in this process the input collections are not 
a ‘thing’, but our reaction on the external stimuli. This reaction, the 
qualisigns as the interprétant, includes the generation of the selection 
of the next sign and object. We emphasise tha t also in the case of other 
signs we will talk about the interprétant in this sense.
In virtue of the fast and continuous nature of cognition, we will as­
sume that such signs are not recognised isolatedly, but only as ‘tempo­
rary’ signs. Such signs, which are approximations of the final assertion, 
are re-presentations of the input qualisigns. Their types are identical to 
the classes defined by Peirce. The recognition process we have in mind 
can be illustrated by the perception of a motion picture. In tha t process, 
a series of pictures (cf. percepts) are input which are not recognised 
isolatedly, but which are necessary for observing motion as a change 
between the first and last picture of such a series.
2. Logic
The qualisigns form the basis for our semiosis. Because such signs are 
perceived as independent signs but it is their unity that signifies the 
phenomenon as a whole, we may assume tha t there exists a need for 
the representation of the full richness of their relation, eventually as a 
proposition.
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The process of semiosis is bootstrapped by the definition of the first 
approximation of sign and object of the phenomenon. We assume that, 
basically, we are capable of identifying two sorts of such signs. One of 
them is the sign of the ‘part-of ’ relation of the observed collections. Such 
a sign is A  or B, or both, formally A + B . Because each of the collections 
is by definition a subset of the input thereby similar to it, such a 
sign is an icon. The other sign is the signification of the simultaneous 
occurrence of those collections. Such a sign is A  and B, formally A*B. 
Because such an occurrence is a single event which happens ‘now’, it 
is a sinsign. Notice that the object of both the icon and sinsign is the 
collection of qualisigns.
In the example, we can define an icon as ‘ JM  or V (both are ‘parts’ 
of the input), and a sinsign as ‘JM  and V (both appear simultaneously 
in an actual event). We emphasise that each of these signs is a re­
presentation of the collections of the input qualities, a sign tha t we 
recognise but we do not ‘know’.
2.2. S e c o n d  s t a g e  o f  r e c o g n i t i o n
The ‘goal’ of input recognition is the representation of a relation be­
tween the full meaning of A  and B. In this respect the icon A + B  is more 
suitable to be used as a sign because it allows ‘access’ to the individual 
(although interrelated) collections, A  and B, whereas the sinsign can 
only be interpreted as a ‘whole’. The interprétant of this sign (icon) and 
object (qualisigns) must be some via-similarity-signified-aspect of the 
input. Because such a sign must refer to its object, but the qualisigns 
have no denotation, we will assume that in the semiosis the object is 
represented by a sign of it which must be the sinsign.
Similarity can partial, in which case, it can be signified from the 
point of view of the sign or the object. Let us begin with the latter 
one. The sign A (B )  appearing in A + B  can be said to occur in A*B  
simultaneously with a ‘missing’ B (A ). By virtue of our assumption of 
a ‘closed’ universe, something which is not present can be represented 
by negation. As a result we get A * ^B  (-■A * B ), the inhibition function. 
Such a sign, which denotes a qualitatively possible or abstract A (B ), is 
called in the Peircean terminology a rheme. These rheme signs define 
the individual ‘parts’ of the input in an abstract sense, as a potential 
subject of the observed phenomenon.
In the other case, the similarity of A*B  with A + B  is expressed by 
the similarity of A*B  with the individual signs appearing in A + B . This 
yields A * ^B + ^A * B , the exclusive-or function. Such a combination of 
two different kind of possible signs amounts to a rule which is called in
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tion of the exclusive-or function as (A + B )* (^A + ^B )  we get the other 
meaning of the legisign which is an abstract event of the observed and 
complementary collections as a whole, a potential predicate.
But similarity can also be interpreted in the total sense. In that case 
the interprétant refers to the common meaning of the icon and sinsign. 
These signs are about the pair of collections A  and B, which is linked 
to and occur with the pair of collections, ~^A and ~B, complementing 
it. The common meaning of these signs, which is called an index, is rep­
resented in Boolean logic by the DeMorgan postulates or, alternatively, 
the Shaffer and Peirce functions. By virtue of its aspect of linking, an 
index sign also has the meaning of factuality, causality, or conversion. 
By linking the icon and sinsign, respectively, the enumeration of the 
observed qualisigns as ‘parts’, and the representation of those observed 
qualisigns as a ‘whole’, the index (and the DeMorgan rules) can be 
said to reveal how the ‘parts’ define a ‘whole’, and how a ‘whole’ can 
be decomposed to ‘parts’.
In our example, a rheme can be defined as ‘ JM  without V, denoting 
the sign of JM, one which is abstracted from the particular occurrence 
of 1; and ‘1 without M . Notice tha t both rheme signs are representa­
tions of a ‘p a rt’ of the observed phenomenon, in an abstract sense. A 
legisign can be defined as the combination of the interrelated parts, ‘ JM  
without V and ‘1 without JM , providing us with a rule-like abstraction 
of the perceived event. The complementary meaning of the index can 
be expressed by means of ‘John is smiling’ (-■ JM) and ‘Mary has flowers 
in her hand’ (-■]). Complementary signs can be necessary for a correct 
recognition. If, for example, John is not smiling, we may not be able 
to recognise likes as a property, or, we may do so, but then that likes 
might have a different flavour.
2.3. T h i r d  s t a g e  o f  r e c o g n i t i o n
We have now three signs, a rheme, a legisign and an index. Again it 
turns out that with respect to our ‘goal’ the index can more suitably 
function as a sign, whereas the rheme and legisign as (the sign of) 
its object. Indeed, the index signifies the actual relation between the 
observed collections and their context (the complementary qualisigns) 
whereas the rheme and the legisign are only about A  and B , or their 
relation, in an abstract sense.
This signification of the index can be interpreted as complementa­
tion, as the completion of (the sign of) the object by the complementary 
qualities. In the case of the rheme this is formally defined as follows: 
-i(-iA *B ), ~^(A*^B)= A + ^ B , ~^A+B. Such an interprétant refers to
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which relation is now signified via the complementary signs, implicitly 
(cf. implication). Such a sign, which is called in the Peircean terminol­
ogy a dicent, denotes the subject of the observed phenomenon. The com­
pletion of the legisign is as follows: -i(-iA*B+A * ->B)= A*B+^A*^B.  
This sign is the equivalence function which denotes a property, or 
predicate. Such a sign involves the aspect of a definition, or arbitrary 
consensus; it is called in the Peircean classification a symbol.
In our example, a dicent sign can be defined as ‘1 when sm’, or 
‘JM  when if, as the completion of the abstract rheme signs by the 
context, or, alternatively, ‘1 implicating JM , or the other way round. 
A symbol sign can be defined as ‘JM  and 1 (observed signs) when sm 
and H (complementary signs)’ representing the perceived phenomenon 
as a property.
2.4. F i n a l  s t a g e  o f  r e c o g n i t i o n
The symbol sign above signifies an actual relation between the parts of 
the input; the signification of the dicent is implicit. Therefore we will 
take the symbol as a sign and let the dicent function as (the sign of) its 
object. Their interprétant will be the proposition merging the qualities 
of the observed parts into a single sign represented as ‘A is B ’. Formally, 
such a proposition is defined to arise by a syllogism (degenerately, in 
the logical sense). Such an operation, which is also called predication, 
is beyond the scope of Boolean logic.
In our example, the implication relation of ‘J M  and ‘1’ can be 
syllogistically combined with the property ‘JM  and 1 when sm and ff . 
Their common term can be expressed by the complementary signs, 
‘sm’ and ‘Ü’. The resulting argument sign, which is a proposition, can 
be paraphrased as: ‘There is 1 between J  and M .
Returning to the qualisigns, we mention tha t their logical represen­
tation, A, B, ->A, and ~B, can be completed with two more functions:
0 (‘no input’), and 1 (‘input exists’). As a result, we can conclude that 
in the process of semiosis all Boolean functions as signs can emerge and 
tha t these signs have indeed the aspects of Peirce’s sign classes. The 
classification of logical signs is depicted in fig. 3 (on the left-hand side). 
Notice that in our derivation, the interprétant always emerges from 
neighbouring sign and object (such signs are connected in fig. 2 by a 
horizontal line). Such a mediation amounts to an interaction between 
sign and object (which are called the constituents). An alternative 
derivation of logical signs, in which, mediation is defined as the ap­
plication of the logical function of sign to the one of the object may be 
found in (Farkas and Sarbo, 2000).
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Figure 3. Classification of logical signs
3. Language
We will argue tha t language is logic, sequentially. In this section we 
will show that by means of this single condition a model of language 
can be derived which is analogous and isomorphic to the one of logic 
(Sarbo and Farkas, 2001). Language signs are symbols which are subject 
to syntactic and semantic rules. In this paper we will consider only 
syntactic rules, and restrict language to syntax (Quirk et al., 1985).
Syntactic symbols emerge from morphological and phonological ones 
which can be modelled in a similar vein as syntax. In this paper we 
focus on syntactic and morphological signs which are interrelated. An 
argument sign generated by a morphological sign recognition becomes 
a qualisign in a subsequent syntactic semiosis. In what follows, we first 
introduce a a classification of syntactic signs. In this, we will refer by 
a sign class to the classification of syntactic symbols. We will use the 
logical and syntactic names of the qualisigns interchangeably.
‘Sequential’ means that the input symbols appear one after the other 
as qualisigns. Earlier we pointed out tha t the qualisigns are the (first) 
representation of a contrast. In our cognitive model of signs we defined 
such a contrast between continuant and occurrent. Because language 
symbols are about ‘real’ world phenomena (typically), we may assume 
tha t an underlying contrast, analogous to the one of cognition, exists 
in language, too. The language equivalent of continuant and occurrent 
is identified, respectively, in the aspects, ‘thing’ and ‘change’, typically 
represented by nominals and verbs. Because language signs are inher­
ently related to memory, a ‘change’ can also refer to an ‘appearing’ 
new fact, which is a relative change or alteration of some thing or 
event, typically represented by adjectives and adverbs.
3.1. A P R E L IM IN A R Y  C L A S S IF IC A T IO N
We will derive a model of language by transforming our specification of 
logical signs to a sequential one. Such a derivation is partly technical. 
In order not to get drown in the details, we make a preliminary attem pt 
at a semiotic classification of the main syntactic concepts.
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The argument, which is a proposition, must correspond to the notion 
of a sentence in as much as both are expressive of a statement. Hence, 
the dicent must be subject, and the symbol predicate. By virtue of its 
factual meaning (cf. ‘modification’) the index can be an adjective, an 
adverb, or a complemented preposition (in short, prep-compl). A rheme 
is a possible for the subject, for example, a noun; a legisign is an actual 
event in the syntactic sense, tha t is, a ‘structure’ defined as a rule, e.g. 
a verb(-complement).
3.2. T o w a r d s  a  s e q u e n t i a l  v e r s i o n  o f  l o g i c
Although the qualisigns are the representation of a contrast, in the 
sequential case when each qualisign consists of a single symbol, also 
that contrast will ‘appear’ sequentially. Accordingly, a qualisign will 
have either the aspect of a ‘thing’ (A), or a ‘change’ (B).
We argue that the representational need of sign recognition appears 
in language as the relational need of the individual symbols. Accord­
ingly, it will be assumed tha t the qualisigns possess a finite set of 
relational qualities.
Because input symbols, i.e. their qualities, must belong to the ob­
served part of the perceived phenomenon, in language we will not be 
able to distinguish between asserted and negated signs, at least not 
a t this level (we will assume that input symbols are asserted signs). 
This implies tha t language phenomena must include their own context, 
hence a part of the input may have to be devoted to the representation 
of the context as a sign. We can have access to memory knowledge, e.g. a 
lexicon, but such knowledge is not related to the perceived input in any 
way. The lexicon is used for the re-presentation of the morphologically 
finished argument signs as a syntactic qualisign, in the definition of 
their syntactic relational qualities.
3.2 .1 .  Unique universe
Syntactic qualisigns consist of a single symbol and define a unique 
universe, therefore different qualisigns cannot be merged. Because input 
symbols appear continuously, (i) ‘place ’ has to be created for the ap­
pearing next qualisign. W hat can be done with the previous qualisign? 
Obviously, the answer is tha t we have to re-present it by another sign. 
Following our model of sign recognition, such a sign can be an icon, or 
a sinsign.
Earlier we mentioned that, in the case of language, (ii) a qualisign 
is either A or B , but not both. Because a sinsign is a reference to 
an event, it must include the aspect of a ‘change’. Accordingly, the 
re-presentation of a qualisign which is B  can be a sinsign, hence the
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one which is A  must be an icon. Such a re-presentation involves the 
generation of a new sign, the denotation of which is identical to the 
one of the qualisign. Prom the bottom-up ‘nature’ of our model of signs 
it follows that the new sign will include the meaning of the older one 
degenerately (in the semiotic sense).
3.2 .2 .  Unique representation
Icon and sinsign symbols are different representations of the same qual­
isign. Prom condition (ii) and the uniqueness of signs2 it follows that 
such symbols typically will not be adjacent. Accordingly, (iii) icon and 
sinsign symbols implement a ‘sorting ’ re-presentation of the qualisigns. 
Notice that, in the particular case, different icon and sinsign symbols 
can be adjacent if they define a shared universe.
By virtue of (i), we have to represent the previous qualisign by a new 
sign, which is an icon or a sinsign. The appearance of this new sign, in 
turn, may force us to do the same for the previous icon or sinsign and, 
eventually, signs may have to be generated in any class. In sum, the 
conclusion can be drawn that in the sequential model of logic there is 
sign generation by need.
3.3. S i g n  g e n e r a t i o n  b y  n e e d
In our model of signs the interprétant emerges via the interaction of 
sign and object. In language, such an interaction is called a binding. 
We assume that the denotation of a symbol emerging from a binding 
is defined by a homomorphism on the denotations of the constituent 
symbols.
Due to the sequential nature of language signs, we also have to 
consider degenerate variants of a binding which are: accumulation and 
coercion. In an accumulation, an existing sign is combined with another 
sign of the same type. Such an interaction assigns the same meaning 
to both constituents thereby rendering them indistinguishable. In a 
coercion, a new sign is generated for the denotation of an existing sign 
(which is said ‘coerced’). Coercion applies if the signs, which are to 
interact, are incapable for accumulation or binding. In this form of 
an interaction we refer by the ‘constituent’ to the sign triggering the 
interaction.
3.3 .1 . Default scheme of recognition
Coercions play an im portant role in syntactic sign recognition more 
specifically in, what we call, the default scheme. This type of semiosis 
can be characterised as follows.
2 Lexically ambiguous symbols have a unique denotation for each meaning.
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By virtue of (i), signs are generated by need. The coercion of a 
qualisign, A  or B, yields either an icon or a sinsign. Due to subsequent 
applications of (i), such an icon or sinsign is coerced, respectively, 
to a rheme or legisign, and eventually to a dicent or a symbol. An 
index cannot emerge this way, because there are no negated signs. By 
virtue of the appearing qualisigns, in the end, we may have a dicent 
and a symbol sign which are adjacent and generate the argument (the 
sentence as a sign). Notice tha t also a dicent or a symbol can be coerced 
to an argument, but such a sign will be a degenerate one, semiotically, 
because an argument sign represents the observed phenomenon in its 
character (Peirce, 1931),  hence it must include both types of qualities.
In as much as, in our model, an argument arises from a dicent 
and a symbol sign (subject and predicate), we may conclude that, in 
the default case, only subject and predicate are recognised and their 
relation represented as a sentence. It will be argued tha t language sign 
recognition always follows this scheme and any deviation from it may 
only occur if otherwise a successful parse cannot be found. Such a case 
will be described in the next section.
3.4. T h e  g e n e s i s  o f  t h e  c o n t e x t
In language we are burdened by the task of the recognition of the 
entire string of input symbols as a single sign. Although, in some cases, 
the sign generation operations (coercion, accumulation and binding) 
may be unsatisfactory, the above goal can yet be achieved if we allow 
for a sign, which is potentially subject or predicate, to be represented 
degenerately (in the semiotic sense). Such signs define, what we called, 
the context. The degenerate representation of symbols also plays an 
im portant role in the ‘stepwise construction’ of signs.
Sign degeneration ( |)  can be explicated by the ontological and phe­
nomenological types of signs indicated in fig. 2, as follows. Dicentjindex 
if the subject meaning is not present ‘formally’ (such a sign is not 
the subject of the sentence); symboLJindex if the predicate meaning is 
not present ‘mediationally’ (such a sign is not capable for mediating 
between subject and sentence); dicent^rheme if the subject meaning 
is unfinished ‘indexically’ (such a sign is not a reference of something 
actually existing); symboLJiegisign if the predicate meaning is unfin­
ished ‘relationally’ (such a sign is not referring to an actually existing 
property).
For example, a sample context sign is dicentjindex in Mary, John 
likes (the potential subject Mary becomes a context sign for likes); a 
sample ‘stepwise construction’ is symboLJiegisign in likes Mary alone
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(the potential predicate likes Mary is represented degenerately as a 
legisign so tha t the context sign alone can complete its meaning).
3.4 .1 .  Nested signs
The existence of degenerate signs is related to our ability of parsing a 
contiguous segment of input symbols independently from the rest of the 
input. When such a segment is recognised, its meaning relative to the 
input as a whole is represented degenerately. Due to this degeneration, 
such a symbol will not become an isolatedly recognised sign. We will 
call such a segment a nested input, its sign a nested sign. The class of a 
nested sign (after degeneration) is equal to the class of one of its con­
stituents (recursively). For example, a segment recognised as a dicent 
can be represented degenerately as a rheme or an index. The semiosis 
of a nested input can be implemented by a recursive application of the 
sign recognition ‘machinery’.
In some cases we can know in advance if a symbol eventually will 
become a context sign and this allows certain optimisations. If a nested 
sign consists of a single input symbol, the recursive analysis may be 
replaced by a coercion. For example, an index sign can be directly gener­
ated by coercion from such an icon or sinsign. This kind of optimisation 
is typical for adjective, adverb and prep-compl symbols. Although such 
symbols are referring to a perfect property they cannot function as 
a predicate and this ‘feature’ is lexically specified in their syntactic 
rule. Also the ‘stepwise construction’ of a sign can be optimised by the 
immediate generation of a degenerate representation of its meaning.
The representation of logical signs in the sequential case is depicted 
in fig. 3 (on the right-hand side). Although the same denotations, A  and 
B , appear many times, each of the occurrences has a different meaning. 
We will argue tha t syntactic signs can be specified on the basis of this 
classification by mapping the logical functions to syntactic symbols. 
The definition of such a mapping is the subject of the next section.
3.5. R e l a t i o n a l  n e e d
Earlier we mentioned tha t syntactic symbols possess a relational need 
by means of which syntactic sign interactions emerge. Analogously to 
logic, such interactions are always between symbols of a different type 
of relational qualities. Clearly, binding is only possible if the universes of 
the interacting symbols have ‘something’ in common. More specifically, 
we demand that the set of relational qualities of such symbols are not 
disjoint, in which case, they are said syntactically compatible.
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3.5.1. The representation of syntactic qualities
If, as we argue, logical and language signs are analogous, this must 
hold for syntactic symbols too. We map continuant and occurrent, 
respectively, via the contrast of language (‘thing’ and ‘change’) to 
the relational types ‘passive’(p) and ‘active’(a). Accordingly, the re­
lational need or valency of a syntactic qualisign will be represented 
as a pair, consisting of a relational type and a finite set of relational 
qualities which are syntactic properties. Formally, we define the type 
‘neutral’(n); a sign having such a need is finished (relationally). We 
will refer to the relational need of a sign by its type, and call it an a-, 
p- and n-need, ambiguously. Although we will not specify the syntactic 
properties of language signs, we will introduce a classification for them. 
It will be argued that such a classification amounts to a (semiotic) 
definition of the types of speech.
The mapping mentioned above can be used for the definition of 
an initial representation of the syntactic relational needs of symbols 
in the different sign classes. In virtue of their semiotic function, this 
representation can be adjusted as follows.
Syntactic qualisign, icon, sinsign and argument symbols must have 
an n-need. Indeed, qualisigns are independent signs which cannot in­
teract; icon and sinsign symbols are typically not adjacent and do not 
establish a relation; an argument which is the sentence as a sign must 
be finished. If icon, index and symbol signs which function as a sign 
in the sense of the triadic relation, are considered relationally ‘active’ 
and have an a-need by definition, then the signs which function as an 
object must be ‘passive’ and possess a p-need. However, in order to be 
consistent with the traditional lexical definition of language symbols, 
we have to adjust the above mapping by exchanging the relational 
need of sign and object. Lexical definitions always specify the relational 
properties of a symbol from the point of view of the sign in the sense 
of the triadic relation, but, as we have pointed out, in our model of 
language a symbol can also function as an object.
For example, the predicate of the sentence may arise from a legisign 
(a verb) via the complementation of an index. Traditionally, such a 
complement is lexically specified in the verb’s entry. Semiotically, how­
ever, it is the complement that points to the verb and selects its actual 
meaning. This interpretation is also conform with the default scheme 
of sign recognition, according to which, verbs only function as a sign in 
the predication symbol interaction. Because also adjectives and adverbs 
function as a sign in the sense of the triadic relation, in our model of 
language the concept of ‘modifier’ and ‘complement’ amalgamate.
Any sign is a re-presentation of the qualisigns, therefore the qualities 
tha t contribute to the relational needs in the various classes must be
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present in the qualisigns. Accordingly, we will represent the relational 
need of an input symbol as a set, an element of which is a triple, 
consisting of a type, a reference to a class in which the input symbol 
can contribute to tha t type of a relational need, and a set of syntactic 
properties.
Due to the sequential nature of language, a p-need is typically op­
tional. A sign which can function as an object in the sense of the triadic 
relation, will only do tha t if there is a sign referring to it (in English, 
the p-need of a dicent sign is not optional, in virtue of the SV(O)-rule). 
However, an a-need is never optional. The presence of a sign always 
implies the presence of its object. In sum, the syntactic properties of a 
symbol only define the symbol’s potential relational need in the various 
sign classes. Such a need can become an actual relational need in the 
course of the sign recognition process (when it is clear from the context 
the term ‘actual’ may be omitted).
In what follows, the relational need of a symbol will be given in 
terms of its a-need in the different classes (p-needs, as well as, syntactic 
properties are not specified). For example, the valency of a transitive 
verb will be defined as a set, {legisign,symbol}, referring to an a-need, 
respectively, for the complement and the subject of the verb.
3.5.2. Implementation
Syntactic signs are re-presentations of their constituent symbols. Ac­
cordingly, the relational need of any sign must be less than, or at most 
equal to the union of the valency of the constituents (in the examples 
we will assume tha t the two are always equal).
We demand tha t an actual relational need is always satisfied. In 
particular, a binding satisfies a pair of a- and a p-needs by resolving 
them; an accumulation merges a pair of needs to a single one; a sign 
generated by coercion inherits the valency of the sign coerced. The 
actual relational need of a sign in some class can be empty, in which 
case, the sign is considered neutral (in that class). Such a sign cannot 
take part in a binding (but it can be subject to accumulation and 
coercion). This definition of ‘neutral’ is conform to our earlier use of this 
notion. Syntactic symbol interactions require the compatibility of their 
constituents. We demand that the syntactic properties corresponding 
to the actual relational need of the constituents of an interaction are 
equivalent.
Because the index sign does not partake in the default scheme of 
syntactic sign recognition, the generation of such a sign is subject to 
special conditions. We demand tha t a symbol can become an index 
having a p-need, either if any other analysis of tha t symbol eventually 
fails, or, if there exists an a-need due to a compatible legisign symbol.



















Figure 4• Classification of syntactic symbols
3.6. A P e ir c e a n  m o d e l  o f  s y n t a x
In this section we specify the relational need of language symbols. In­
stead of using a set representation, we directly refer to the sign classes. 
For the denotation of language signs we make use the types of speech.
Syntactic qualisigns are specified as follows: j4=noun; B=verb, ad­
jective, adverb, prep(-compl), where ‘com pl’ can be a noun, verb, ad­
jective or adverb. Formally, we also define 0 = ‘no input’ and l = ‘end of 
input’. The latter can represent the ‘dot’ symbol which is considered 
an A and B  sign, having an a-need in any class, but incompatible with 
any sign except for itself. Hence, the dot symbol is capable of ‘forcing’ 
the realisation of pending interactions. In the examples we will assume 
tha t the input is closed by a finite number of dots.
The classification of syntactic signs is depicted in fig. 4 (on the left- 
hand side). Here, and also in later diagrams, a potential n- and p-need 
which occurs in combination with other relational needs is omitted. 
Notice in the index class the a-need of adjective, adverb and prep-compl 
symbols. Because the syntactic properties are omitted in our specifica­
tion, an a(p)-need may stand for a number of triples. For example, in 
the legisign class, the a-need of a verb can represent the relational need 
for all of its complements. The a-need of syntactic symbols can also be 
used for a semiotic definition of the (main) types of speech as shown in 
fig. 4 (on the right-hand side).
The analogy of language symbols with logical signs must be clear. 
For example, the rheme is a noun from which some or all of its re­
latedness with the context and the predicate is removed, or inhibited. 
The index sign is an adjective or adverb which represents complemen­
tary information. The legisign is a verb (-complement) which refers to 
the event representation of the exclusive-or function. The subject is 
a completed noun which implicates the predicate it is related to. The 
predicate is a completed verb which is a property, an equivalence.
3.6.1. Example
We consider the syntactic analysis of our sample phenomenon given as 
the utterance, John likes Mary. The abbreviations J, 1 and M  are now 
denoting the corresponding syntactic symbols. The relational need of 1
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Figure 6. Syntactic analysis of Mary, John likes
is defined as {legisign,symbol}; J  and M  have no a-need in any class. 
The analysis is depicted in fig. 5.
In step (a) the symbol J  enters as a qualisign. In the next step, the 
qualisign 1 appears, but which cannot accumulate with J  because qual­
isigns are independent signs. Therefore J  has to be coerced to an icon. 
The appearing qualisign M  forces 1 to coerce to a sinsign, in step (c). 
Because icon and sinsign symbols are only ‘sorting’, binding is not 
possible and J  has to be coerced to a rheme. Notice tha t J  cannot 
be coerced to an index, because the conditions are not satisfied (cf. 
sect. 3.5.2). In step (d) the appearing dot symbol forces M  to coerce to 
an icon and this, in turn, makes 1 to be re-presented as a legisign. Again, 
it cannot become an index because neither the special conditions are 
satisfied, nor has 1 an a-need in this class. At this stage of the analysis 
we ‘know’ that J  and 1 are, respectively, the possibles for the subject 
and predicate.
Due to the next dot symbol, M  is coerced in step (e) to an index sign 
by virtue of the a-need of 1 in the legisign class. In (f) two recognition 
steps are merged. In the first, J  is coerced to a dicent by virtue of the 
next dot symbol. In the second, the binding between M  and 1 yielding 
the predicate 1M is established. In the last step (not displayed) J  is 
predicated by 1M and the sentence JIM emerges as a sign.
c’) d ’) e ’) f ’) g ’)
Figure 7. Syntactic analysis of Mary, John likes (cont.)
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J l M & &
Figure 8. Syntactic analysis of John likes Mary and Kim (until the coordinator)
Jl M&K
Figure 9. Coordination (alternative #1 )
The analysis of a ‘marked’ word-order variant of our sentence is 
depicted in fig. 6-7. Here, the potential subject M  is represented degen­
erately as an index. This is a consequence of the failure of the analysis 
following the default scheme (cf. fig. 6), because the entire input is not 
merged to a single sign. The analysis is backtracked, as a consequence 
of which the icon M  is coerced, in step (c’), to an index (cf. fig. 7).
3.7. C o o r d i n a t i o n
In this section we make an attem pt at applying our framework to the 
complex phenomenon of coordination. Because of space, we will restrict 
ourselves to the description of the kernel of such an algorithm.
Basically, coordination consists of three phases. In the first phase, 
input symbols are analysed up to the coordinator. In the second phase, 
first, all existing signs are saved, but their relational needs are remem­
bered as ‘traces’ for later use by the algorithm. Then, an initial segment 
of the remaining input is analysed as a nested sign. In the course of the 
recursive analysis, existing signs and saved ones of the same class are 
allowed to be coordinated (this also includes the inheritance of prop­
erties). In the last phase, the remaining saved signs are restored. Save 
and restore, respectively, can be preceded or followed by the completion 
of a finite number of (pending) interactions.
An example is shown in fig. 8-10 (saved signs are enclosed in paren­
theses). Notice in fig. 9 the use of the ‘traced’ a-need of 1 in the coercion 
of the icon K  to an index. Nesting also plays an im portant role in the
J&K lM
Figure 10. Coordination (alternative # 2 )
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analysis of subordination. Such an application of recursion is exempli­
fied in the Appendix. Notice that the conditions for the save and restore 
operations described above also apply to nested signs.
3.8. M o r p h o l o g y
We will argue that morphology (or, morpho-syntax) can be specified 
analogously to syntax. Whereas syntactic sign interactions generate 
the sign’s sentential qualities (which can be used in a sentence level 
analysis) morphological sign interactions define the sign’s syntactic 
properties.
The classes of morphological signs can be characterised as follows 
(now we will refer by a sign class to the classification of morphological 
signs). Dicent and symbol signs are finished morphologically and only 
accomplish a sorting re-presentation of signs as it is justified by their 
different syntactic properties. A symbol, for example, an adjective, has 
the property tha t in a syntactic analysis it requires a complement adja­
cent to it in the input (i.e. on ‘surface’ level). A dicent, for example, a 
noun or verb, does not have such a property. Such a symbol represents 
an actually existing, morphologically finished sign.
Rheme, index and legisign symbols, respectively, represent a quali­
tative possibility, a factuality, and something rule-like. For example, a 
rheme is a noun or verb, which (possibly) fits in the sentence, syntacti­
cally; an index is an article (a sign of definiteness), or, a morphological 
complement; a legisign is a prep(-compl), a morphological structure 
defined as a rule. These classes are involved in the generation of syn­
tactic relational needs. For example, an article which is an index sign, 
can provide a morphological rheme symbol with a syntactic p-need. 
Such a relational need represents certain referential properties which, 
from the logical point of view, correspond to the inhibition function. 
A preposition, which is a legisign morphologically, can endow an index 
sign with a syntactic a-need. (N.B. the syntactic relational need should 
not be mixed up with the morphological valency which, akin to syntax, 
determines the morphological sign interactions.)
Finally, icon and sinsign symbols refer to a sorting re-presentation of 
the qualisigns alike to syntax. But more typically, such symbols will be 
adjacent, in which case, their interaction generates a specific syntactic 
property. For example, the interaction of a verb (icon) and a participle 
affix (sinsign) can generate a symbol having adjective-like syntactic 
properties. The constituents of such interactions define a shared uni­
verse (cf. sect. 3.2.2). In English, such icon and sinsign are typically 
written as one word. The classification of morphological symbols is












Figure 11. Classification of morphological symbols
’ M-s
Figure 12. Initial part of the morphological analysis of John like -s Mary
displayed in fig. 11 (dicent, symbol and argument signs are assumed to 
arise via binding as defined earlier).
Morphological qualisigns are specified as follows: j4=noun, verb, 
adjective, adverb, coordinator; B=preposition, article, particle, affix. 
Formally, we also define 0 = ‘no input’, and 1 = ‘separation’. The latter 
can represent a ‘space’ symbol which is considered an A and B  sign, 
incompatible for any interaction, except for accumulation (but only 
with the sign triggering the operation). Hence, the space symbol can 
‘sweep’ out the morphologically finished signs. Dot symbols are treated 
in the same way as in syntax. Contrary to syntax, in our model of 
morphology, recursion is not required. This may be due to the le ft- 
and right-linearity property of morphological signs. Such signs typically 
arise via ‘gluing’ adjacent input symbols together. A sample analysis 
of the sentence John like -s Mary is shown in fig. 12 (an accumulated 
space is omitted). In this, and later examples we allow for subsequent 
morphological analyses to overlap.
3.9. F o r m a l  d e f i n i t i o n
We specify a recogniser for our model (except for nesting) as a push­
down automaton. Formally, the automaton is defined as an 8-tuple 
M =  (K ,C ,I ,T ,p ,s o ,F ,A )  where K={.so,.si} is a finite set of states, 
C  is a finite set of sign classes, I  is a finite set of input symbols, T is a 
finite set of stack symbols, p ^ I ^ T  is a function defining the relational 
need of input symbols, so is the initial state, F Ç K  is a set of final states, 
A  is a transition relation consisting of is a finite set of transition rules.
A transition rule is a mapping (p, u, ß) —> (q, 7 ) where p,q  G K  are, 
respectively, the states before and after the transition, u € I* are the 
symbols to be read, and ß , j  G T* are the symbols to be popped and 
pushed. We will assume tha t the stack is divided into frames. A frame
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contains a storage area for each sign class, consisting of a location for 
the next and the existing sign of the class and a constant number of 
locations for temporary values.
The start rule and the one which handles the input of symbols are 
specified as follows (e denotes the empty string, e G T stands for the 
empty value): start (so,e,e) —> ( s i , ie); read ( s i ,u , ie) —> ( s i , ip(u)) 
where ix denotes a frame, in which, the existing sign location of the 
qualisign class contains the value x  (the next sign location of this class 
is not used). For all other locations of the frames we assume tha t they 
have an identical value in ie and ip(u). All other rules are ‘internal’ 
transition rules which operate only on the stack (<f> and <f>' denote 
frames): transition  (si,e,<f>) —> (si,<f>'<f>).
We will simplify the specification of a transition rule by only defining 
4> and (f)', and only specifying those locations of a frame which are 
involved in the transition (those not involved are assumed to have an 
identical value in <f> and <f>'). A further simplification is achieved by 
representing a frame as a set of storage areas.
Temporary locations can be necessary, for example, for the evalua­
tion of a condition. The specification of such computations may require 
a number of internal rules which we alternatively define as a (logical) 
expression. Accordingly, the specification of temporary locations will 
be omitted. The value of the next and existing sign location of a class 
is a relational need, represented as a constant (cf. sect. 3.5.1).
Nondeterminism is implemented by backtracking (Aho and Ullman, 
1972). In a transition rule we allow a reference to the actual evaluation 
mode, forward(‘f ’) or backward(‘b ’), via the function mode. We will 
make use of a graph G= (C ,E ) where E =  E dUEh, and Ed,EhC C x C  
are, respectively, the set of directed edges and horizontal lines (undi­
rected edges) as shown in fig. 2. The successors and neighbours of a class 
are defined, respectively, by the functions succ(c)= {c'|(c, c') €E^} and 
adj(c)=  {c'|(c, c') G ü/ft}. An element of succ(c) and adj(c) is denoted, 
respectively, as cs and ca.
In sum, in a transition rule we will refer to a set of triples (the set 
brackets are omitted). An element of such a set is given as (c,s,s') 
where c is a class, and s and s’ are, respectively, its next and existing 
signs (any of s and s’ may not be specified, in which case, it is denoted 
by a symbol). The triples on the left- and right-hand side of a rule, 
respectively, refer to the current(^) and next frame(<//) on the top of 
the stack (but a condition always refers to the current frame). The 
logical type of the next sign (qn) of the qualisign class, lt(qn), is A  if 
qn has no a-need in any class; and B, otherwise. The names of the sign 
classes are abbreviated to a four letter name (also in the examples).
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sorting
(q u a i,- , r ) ,  (icon, e ,- ) —¥ (quai, e), (icon, r,_ ) IF  Zf(r) =  A.
(quai, -,r),  (sins, e, _) —¥ (q u a i,-, e), (sins, r,J) IF  lt(r) = B.
The remaining internal transitions are given by rule schemes for 
the class variable X  (X  G C\qual). In virtue of the special conditions 
required by the index class, the triple corresponding to the legisign 
class is explicitly defined in some of the rule schemes. We make use of 
the functions cmpacc and cmpbnd which, respectively, yield true if their 
arguments can syntactically accumulate and bind in the class specified. 
We also use the functions ntrl, pssv and actv which, respectively, succeed 
if their argument has a n-, p- and an a-need in the class given; and 
the functions acc, coerce and bind which, respectively, determine the 
relational need of the symbols yielded by accumulation, coercion and 
binding. The function cndix checks if the special conditions of the index 
class hold. The degenerate variants of the rule ‘binding’ are omitted 
(in such a rule, the result of binding emerges in the class of one of the 
constituents). The sentence as a sign arises in the next sign location of 
the argument class.
accumulation
( X , r , r ' )  —¥ (X,e,  acc(X,r,r' ))  IF  c m p a c c (X ,r,r ').
coercioni
(X, r , r ') ,  (Xa,e, e), ( X s, e, .), (legi, . ,  rt) (X, c, r), ( X s, r c, _)
IF  ntrl(X,  r ' )A^cmpacc(X,  r, r ' )Acndix(Xs, rc,ri)
W H E R E  rc = coerce(X, r ' , X s).
coerc ion
(.X , e , r ' ) , ( X a, ra, e ) , ( X s ,e, -) , ( legi, - , r l)-► ( X , e , e ) , (X a,e ,ra) , ( X s, r c,-) 
IF  ntrl(X,  r ' )Acndix(Xs , r c,ri) W H E R E  r c =  coerce(X, r', X s).
binding
(X , r , r ') ,  ( X a,e, r'a), ( X s, e, _), (legi, n )  ^  (X,  e, r), (X a,e, e), ( X s, rh, _) 
IF  pssv(X,r ' )  A actv(Xa,r'a)Acm pbnd(X , r ' , X a,r'a)Acndix(Xs, r b,ri) 
W H E R E  r b = bind(Xs,r',r'a).
c n d ix (X ,r , r i)  :
X=indxA(pssv(X ,r )A(mode  = lb' \/actv(legi,ri)))\/actv(X,r))\/  T R U E  .
A parser can be defined by using temporary locations. Such a lo­
cation may contain the stack representation of an input symbol, or, 
one or two constants which are used as pointers to locations of the 
previous frame on the stack. When a segment of input symbols is to 
be analysed recursively, transition may proceed until no rules apply. 
Then, the current frame is pushed to the stack. Upon return from a 
recursion, the current frame and the saved one are ‘merged’ according 
to the particular properties of the nested sign.
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Fig. 2 defines a partial ordering on Peirce’s classes of signs (horizontal 
lines are now neglected). Earlier we mentioned that a binding resolves, 
and an accumulation merges a pair of actual relational needs, whereas 
a sign generated by coercion inherits the valency of the sign coerced. In 
sum, there is no increase in the relational needs due to the qualisigns in 
any interaction. The class of a sign yielded by binding and accumulation 
is not lower, and the one yielded by coercion is definitely higher in the 
partial ordering, than the class of its constituent(s).
In the conditions of the transition rules we make use operations on 
sets which are intersection (e.g. for testing the compatibility of sym­
bols) and union (e.g. for the generation of the sign yielded by binding). 
Each condition may need the evaluation of a constant number of such 
operations. Because the sets are finite (they cannot exceed the size of 
the lexicon, which is a constant), the complexity of the conditions is 
0 (1 ) in the number of set operations. In as much as the number of 
classes as well as the relational need of input symbols are finite, the 
processing of an input symbol (which terminates when no transition 
rule applies) requires a constant number of transitions which are 0 (1) 
complex each. Eventually we get tha t the complexity of our model (if 
nesting is not allowed) is O(n) where n  is the number of input symbols.
The complexity remains unchanged if additionally we allow nesting. 
In such a case, an input symbol is allowed to recursively ‘s ta rt’ recog­
nition, and a later symbol to ‘end’ it, but each symbol is allowed to 
start or end recursion only once. We assume tha t the stack frames are 
linked to each other via a ‘previous frame’ pointer stored in a temporary 
location. Upon entering a recursion the current frame is saved. Upon 
return, there will be a single (nested) sign in the topmost frame of 
the stack. Let k denote the number of input symbols involved in the 
recursively analysed segment. Then, to find and fetch the values of the 
last saved frame needs at most O(k) steps, but the frames involved in 
this process will not be visited anymore. This can be solved by adjusting 
the previous frame pointers of the frames of the recursively analysed 
segment. Accordingly, any frame will be visited at most three times 
and the complexity of the algorithm will be 3*0(n)  which is O(n).
3 .10 . C o m p l e x i t y
4. Sum m ary and com m ents
A novel framework for language modelling is introduced which is based 
on Peirce’s theory of signs. It is argued that such a model is only linearly 
complex. This result is conform with the experience that language is
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a real-time complex phenomenon (Paul, 1984). An advantage of the 
Peircean approach is its potential of generalising the many issues of 
language as sign phenomena. Another advantage of the use of Peirce’s 
semiotic is that the ‘intermediate’ results of sign recognition, which we 
called approximations, are always meaningful, both in the linguistic 
and the logical sense.
There is an interesting coincidence of our model with cognition 
theory, more specifically, with the concept of the short term memory 
(Broadbent, 1975). Peirce’s classification consists of nine signs. One of 
them, the qualisign, is a special sign for which we have no denotation. 
Another one, the argument sign, is either the final result of recognition, 
or, is a nested sign, in which case it is recognised recursively (the signs 
saved by virtue of a recursion are assumed to be stored in a different 
memory area). In sum, the number of signs tha t have to be simultane­
ously represented during the process of semiosis, is seven, precisely the 
estimated size of the short term  memory.
Finally, the combination of our assumption that, ‘real’ world phe­
nomena can be observed by means of signs, with the results of this paper 
allows us to raise a conjecture: Whenever we experience a phenomenon 
as a qualisign, and we are able to interpret it as an argument sign, 
then there must exist a linearly complex system of symbols which is 
meaningful.
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A p p en d ix
In this section we illustrate the analysis of more complex examples 
and discuss some of the properties of our model of language. The 
examples are labelled by the corresponding language phenomenon. The 
presentation of an analysis is simplified by introducing a tabular form 
for the sign matrix. In such a table, a column corresponds to a sign 
class and a row to the recognition of an input symbol. In the examples, 
the treatm ent of space and dot symbols is omitted and the final step 
of sign recognition (the generation of an argument sign) is removed. A 
reference to a transition rule is abbreviated: input(i), accumulation(a), 
coercei(ci), coerce2(c2) and binding(b); degeneration is indicated by a 
subscript ‘d ’. The accumulation of symbols is denoted by a “/ ” sign. 
Input symbols are w ritten in boldface.
PP-attachment
Our first example is the sentence Mary eats pizza w ith a fork. The mor­
phological analysis is depicted in table I. In step 8, the index sign ‘a’ 
binds to the rheme ‘fork’ and complements it with the property of ‘def­
initeness’. The morphological sign ‘a fork’ is represented degenerately 
as an index. This index sign complements the legisign, ‘w ith’, yielding 
‘with a fork’, a prep-compl sign having adjective- or adverb-like syntac­
tic properties. The output of the analysis is: (Mary)(eats)(pizza)(with 
a fork) where an item enclosed in parentheses denotes an argument sign 
generated.
For the syntactic analysis, the relational needs are defined as follows: 
‘eats’={legi, symb}, ‘with a fork’={m<£r}. The parses are displayed in 
table II and III (in the latter, only the steps deviating from the first 
one are given).
Coordination
We consider the sentence Mary is a democrat and proud o f it  which is 
morphologically analysed as: (M ary)(is)(proud)(of it). The syntactic 
relational needs are: ‘is’={legi, symb}, ‘p roud ’= {m <£r}, ‘of i t’={indx}. 
The resulting analysis is depicted in table IV. In step 8, the index signs 
‘proud’ and ‘of it’ are merged to ‘proud of it’ having a single a-need in 
the index class. The coordination of ‘proud of i t ’ with ‘a dem ocrat’ is 
possible because, syntactically, both signs are ‘is’-complements.
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Table I. Morphological analysis of Mary eat -s pizza with a fork
nr. I qual | icon | sins | rhme
0 Mary(M)
1 eat(e) M
2 -s e M
3 pizza(p) e -s M
4 with(w) P e-s
5 a(a) w P





indx legi dent symb rule
i, ei
i, c i, ci
i, ci
M i, Ci, b, Ci
e-s i, c i, c i, ci
w e-s i, c i, ci
a w P Cl, Cl, Cl, Cl





Table II. Syntactic analysis of Mary eats pizza with a fork (alternative # 1 ) 
nr. I qual | icon | sins | rhme | indx | legi | dent | symb | rule
0 Mary(M) i
1 eats(e) M i, ci
2 pizza(p) e M i, Cl, C2
3 with a fork(waf) P M e i, Cl, C2
4 waf M P e Cl, bd
5 M Waf e-p Cl
6 Waf e-p M b
7 M e-p-Waf b
Table III. Syntactic analysis of Mary eats pizza with a fork (alternative # 2 ) 
nr. I qual | icon | sins | rhme | indx | legi | dent | symb | rule
3’ with a fork(waf) P M e i, C2
4’ waf P e M Cl
5’ P waf e M b d
6’ P-waf e M b
7’ M e-p-Waf b
Table IV. Syntactic analysis of Mary is a democrat and proud of it 
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Table V. Syntactic analysis of A man entered who was covered with mud
nr. I qual | icon | sins | rhme | indx | legi | dent | symb
0 a man (am)
1 entered(e)
2 who(wj1) e âm
recursive call
3 was covered (wctj) wh
4 with mud (wm) wcd wh
5 wm wh wcd
6 Wh wm Wcd
7 wm Wcd wh
8 wh Wc d -W m
return






We analyse the sentence A man entered who was covered w ith mud. 
From the morphological analysis we get: (A man) (entered) (who) (was 
covered)(with mud). In the syntactic analysis (cf. table V) we make 
use of a recursion initiated by the symbol ‘who’. The syntactic re­
lational needs are: ‘entered’={legi, symb}, ‘was covered’={legi, symb}, 
‘with mud’={mcfa:}. In the recursively analysed part, who was covered 
with mud, the symbol ‘who’ is considered a dummy subject. However, it 
is its indexical meaning that determines the properties of the degenerate 
representation of the nested sign (wcm). In the example, wcm is assumed 
to have adjective-like syntactic properties.
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